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Abstract:  
There can be few people that are unaware that Apollo 13 was on its way to the 
moon when an explosion caused several key systems to fail. Fortunately, the 
interlinked crises experienced by the Apollo 13 crew have been extensively 
documented. Using grounded theory techniques, we have analysed these rich 
data from an organisation development perspective and found that NASA’s 
ability to respond effectively was enabled by eight interdependent capabilities 
that can be adopted by other organisations that need to be resilient in crisis 
situations. 
The distinctive capabilities are: (i) active role modelling of an engineering-
excellence ethos by the upper echelon, (ii) collective utilisation of standardised 
rigorous problem-solving methodologies, (iii) technology-enabled systemic 
situation awareness, (iv) extensive and forensic simulations of multiple 
contingencies; (v) clarity about decision ownership, (vi) aligned granular 
innovation capability, (vii) proof of the capability of individuals to be efficient 
and effective, despite adversity and (viii) a heedful group-mind. 
Keywords: Apollo 13; Crisis Readiness; Role Models; Organisational Agility; 
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Hey, we've got a problem here 
These words, spoken by Apollo 13’s Command Module Pilot, Jack Swigert, gave an 
intimation of serious trouble for Apollo 13 (NASA, 2020). Over the next hour the extent 
of the crisis began to be understood. An an oxygen tank had exploded, destroying power 
generation capability. The space craft was crippled. For the next four days, the astronauts 
and NASA’s mission control organisation, fought to bring the crew back to Earth safely. 
This required overcoming multiple problems, many of which has not been foreseen.  
 
The drama is well known from books, films and television programmes but less well 
understood is how the NASA organisation became capable of enabling the crisis to be 
managed successfully. It is this that we examine, focussing attention on those 
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organisational attributes that can be adapted by other organisations that need to capable 
of dealing with crises. 
 
There is a substantial literature on High Reliability Organisations (Leveson et al., 
2009), organisational resilience (Gover and Duxbury, 2018), leadership in complex 
systems under stress (Martínez-Córcoles, 2018), organising hazardous military initiatives 
(Soykan and Alberts, 2015) and crisis management (Spector, 2019). Likewise, there is an 
extremely large body of literature related to innovation (Tidd and Bessant, 2013). 
However, the role that innovation plays in the management of crises has not been 
extensively explored. The recent crisis related to Covid 19 has demonstrated a need for 
academics and practitioners to understand better the conditions that enable an 
organisation to utilise innovation and agility so as to be more effective in coping with 
crises. 
 
Our methods 
 
Our study examined a specific crisis event (the Apollo 13 flight) in considerable 
depth to assist us to understand the specific behaviours, processes and capabilities that 
enabled a hazardous situation to be understood and mitigated. Layder’s Adaptive Theory 
(Layder, 1998) was our research method, as this provided a means of aligning qualitative 
research data to explore predetermined areas of interest (in our case this was the 
organisational attributes used by NASA for achieving crisis readiness that could be 
adopted more widely). Our orienting concepts were drawn from Organisational 
Sociology (Scott, 2004), Innovation Management (Tidd and Bessant, 2014), Agility 
Studies (Francis, 2020), Social Psychology (Weick and Roberts, 1993) and Organisation 
Development (Hodges, 2020). Our analytical software was NVivo 12. 
 
We were fortunate as the Apollo 13 case has been extensively documented, most 
recently by a remarkable BBC World Service documentary (Fong, 2020b) that has more 
than five hours of recordings, including new interviews with the astronauts and many of 
the key people involved. In addition, we used 18 other sources of information, including 
NASA documentation, films, videos and oral history archive material. 
 
We find that eight organisational attributes can be identified for which there is 
evidence that they could be adopted or adapted by organisations other than NASA. We 
acknowledge that the support for this assertion is nascent, so the list should be considered 
as the beginning of a conversation rather than a definitive list of the organisational 
attributes that can help an organisation to cope effectively with a crisis.  
 
Organisational Attribute One: Active Role Modelling by the Upper Echelon 
 
Robert C. Seamans Jr. was a top manager in NASA in the early days of the Apollo 
Program. Shortly before he died recently, he told the story (Fong, 2019) of how the 
decision was made as to which method would be used for the first moon shot. When  
Seamans joined NASA many of the top NASA executives and engineers, including 
Werner Von Braun, considered that the best solution would be to build a single, huge 
spacecraft, to be called the Nova, that would travel to the moon, land and return to Earth. 
 A consensus was emerging that this would be the best solution but a middle-level 
engineer named John C. Houbolt disagreed. He believed that a totally different approach, 
known as  Lunar Orbit Rendezvous method, was the only viable option (a small craft 
would descend to the moon band but need to rendezvous with an orbiting mother ship for 
the journey home). Later, Houbolt (Yvette Smith, 2014) wrote to Seamans, many levels 
above him in NASA’s hierarchy, saying “somewhat as a voice in the wilderness, do we 
want to go to the moon or not? Why is Nova with its ponderous size simply just 
accepted?”. Seamans’ reflected later, “when I first read the letter my hackles went up and 
I thought I’m getting sick of this guy, he is becoming a pest… and then I thought, maybe 
he is right!” 
 
Over the next few months Houbolt’s argument won favour and the Lunar Orbit 
Rendezvous method was selected for the Apollo moon shots. The effect on NASA’s 
organisational culture of the stance taken by Seamans, and other senior managers, was 
profound. Houbolt’s persistence was openly honoured. Those working in NASA 
experienced that those in the upper echelon personally valued engineering logic above 
organisational status and they were willing to acknowledge that they were wrong. Almost 
certainly without premeditation, Seamans, and other senior leaders in NASA were 
actively role modelling that engineering-excellence was a superordinate organisational 
value that trumped hierarchy, stature and orthodoxy. Narratives that describe how NASA 
was organised during the Apollo Program (Grundstein and Rosholt, 1967) demonstrate 
that the personal values of those at the top of the organisation have a profound effect on 
strategy, organisational culture and (innovation, agility and mission) ambitions. Similar 
viewpoints are common in military organisations (Murray, Berkowitz and Lerner, 2019) 
that can be summarised as ‘character is vitally important’. 
 
The insight that the character and personal values of those in the upper echelon 
profoundly shapes how organisations cope with challenge, uncertainty, and crisis is 
transferable. We suggest that four initiatives are relevant. First, that those selected for 
leadership roles are selected because, in part, their personal values support the required 
identity of the organisation that they seek to lead (Hood, 2008). Second, leaders need to 
be informed as to how they, personally, are perceived across the organisation (Bourne, 
Jenkins and Parry, 2017). Third, values-based coaching should be mandatory for all those 
in the upper echelon (Athanasopoulou and Dopson, 2018). Lastly, top-team building 
should include a component of values clarification (Kets de Vries, 2011). 
 
Organisational Attribute Two: Collective Utilisation of Standardised 
Rigorous Problem-Solving Methodologies 
 
When Apollo 13’s Command Module Pilot, Jack Swigert, announced that “Hey, 
we've got a problem here” many of those outside of NASA will have been unaware that 
the terminology that he was using was precise. It was mandatory in NASA to be aware of 
a structured approach to problem-solving known as Kepner-Tregeo training (Kepner and 
Tregoe, 1981). This approach (known as ‘KT’) describes problem-analysis as enabling 
“us to accurately identify, describe, analyse, and resolve a situation in which something 
has gone wrong without explanation. It gives us a methodological means to extract 
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relevant information from a troublesome situation and set aside irrelevant, confusing 
information” (p.25 authors’ italics). 
 
KT training is rigorous. In the 1960s, the introductory KT course took five-days and 
required that trainees used customised tools on complex simulations that were extremely 
intellectually challenging. Advanced KT training was required several more weeks of 
demanding exercises, practice and discipline. KT is strongly engineering orientated and it 
became a collective orthodoxy in NASA as Lyndon (2008) explained in relation to the 
Apollo 13 crisis, observing that: “the KT process was very thoroughly used in that whole 
sequence of events from trying to understand what caused the problem to using decision 
making on how to get the astronauts back… If you go back and listen to the tapes of 
conversations between Houston and the Apollo 13 crew you will hear KT language used” 
(p. 2). 
 
As far as is known, all of the key decision-makers in mission control during the 
Apollo 13 crises had been fully indoctrinated and practiced in the KT step-by-step 
process (Situation Appraisal - Recognize Problems - Problem Analysis - Decision 
Analysis - Define Standards for Solutions - Test Potential Solutions - Set Contingency 
Actions - Minimize Problem Effects). This breadth of commitment to the use of the KT 
toolkit in NASA   provided a high level of intellectual standardisation. It enabled those 
addressing highly complex and urgent problems to work together as effective ad hoc 
teams with little or no preparation. Importantly, as the KT is intellectually rigorous, and 
strongly evidence-based, conclusions from teams had a higher probability of being 
reliable. 
 
The insight that a shared, embedded and relevant intellectual tool-kit for problem solving 
assists key actors to cope with crises is transferable, and facilitates the development of a 
collective intelligence (McHugh et al., 2016). We suggest that three initiatives are 
relevant. First, select a standardised problem-solving toolkit that is appropriate for the 
types of crises situations that can occur in the organisation (van Aken and Berends, 
2018). Second, ensure that mandatory training is provided for those who could be key 
actors in challenging or crisis situations (Hošková-Mayerováa, 2016). Third, require that 
the logic of the selected problem-solving toolkit is required routinely as problems are 
being addressed, so that the use of the method becomes ‘second-nature’ (Rouleau, 2005). 
 
Organisational Attribute Three: Technology-Enabled Systemic Situation 
Awareness 
 
“After the explosion, Aldrich (Arnold D. Aldrich later became the Director of the 
Space Shuttle Program) had moved into the spacecraft analysis, or SPAN, room, located 
across from mission control. The SPAN room was fitted out with more consoles and 
acted as a bridge between the flight controllers and the army of engineers who had 
actually designed and built the spacecraft. ‘In there were supervisors like me and 
executives from the engineering organizations in NASA and the manufacturers, and this 
group would sit together and monitor the flights,’ says Aldrich. The SPAN room had 
come into being because ‘we learned during Mercury that we wanted immediate access to 
 the manufacturers, that we needed clear and unfiltered data very rapidly’, says Kranz 
(Flight Director)”. 
 
This quotation from Stephen Cass’ comments (2005b, p. 3) provides an excellent 
description of the challenges of the Apollo 13 flight provides a glimpse into the degree to 
which information was shared extensively, in real-time and ready to be interrogated for 
specialist purposes. Not only was this important for decision-making purposes. It had two 
other functions. The sustaining of collective consciousness (discussed further in 
Organisational Attribute Eight) and facilitation of mutual adjustment, meaning that 
individuals were able to see where help was needed and act autonomously to provide it. 
From accounts written at the time it seems that within one hour almost all of those who 
could contribute to solving the spacecraft’s problems had been contacted. 
  
In the influential book, ‘Power to the Edge: Command, Control in the Information 
Age’ that had been written for military planners, the authors, Alberts & Hayes, (2003) 
state that: “during the undertaking of the mission, those involved need to make sense of 
the situation and orchestrate the means to respond in a timely manner. These functions 
are performed iteratively with the means being adjusted dynamically in response to 
changes in the situation and/or command intent. Making sense of the situation is 
inherently dynamic” (p.16-17). This could have been a description of how NASA reacted 
to the crisis on Apollo 13 but, crucially, the technologies and processes were not only in 
place, they were up-and-running enabling the entire support system to become aware of 
the situation and monitor changes. 
 
The insight that an accessible, real-time, reliable, information sharing network that 
enables potential actors to adapt to crises is transferable (Gillespie, 2017). We suggest 
that three initiatives are relevant. First, form a team to undertake an inquiry into how the 
organisation dealt with a recent systemic challenge and to take evidence from those who 
could have helped as to what information they could access (McFillen et al., 2013). 
Second, find examples of other organisations with similar operations and compare and 
contrast their information sharing network with yours (de Castro and Frazzon, 2017). 
Lastly, identify a systemic risk that could affect your organisation and simulate how your 
organisation’s information sharing network could cope with the challenge (Huang, 2015) 
(see Attribute Four, below, for further suggestions on this recommendation). 
 
Organisational Attribute Four: Extensive and Forensic Simulations of 
Multiple Contingencies 
 
“in the run-up to the Apollo 10 mission, the flight controllers and astronauts had been 
thrown a curveball during a simulation. ‘The simulation guys failed those fuel cells at 
almost the same spot,’ as when Apollo 13’s oxygen tank exploded in real life, remembers 
James (“Jim”) Hannigan, the lunar module branch chief, ‘It was uncanny’… At the time, 
the simulation was rejected as unrealistic, and it was soon forgotten by most. NASA 
‘didn’t consider that an authentic failure case’, because it involved the simultaneous 
failure of so many systems, explains Hannigan.  But the simulation nagged at the lunar 
module controllers. They had been caught unprepared and a crew had died, albeit only 
virtually. ‘You lose a crew, even in a simulation, and it’s doom,’ says Hannigan. He 
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tasked his deputy, Donald Puddy, to form a team to come up with a set of lifeboat 
procedures that would work, even with a crippled command module in the mix.  ‘Bob 
Legler was one of the key guys’ on that team, recalls Hannigan. As part of his work, 
Legler “figured out how to reverse the power flow, so it could go from the LM back to 
CSM,” through the umbilicals, says Hannigan. “That had never been done. Nothing had 
been designed to do that.” Reversing the power flow was a trick that would ultimately be 
critical to the final stages of Apollo 13’s return to Earth” (Cass, 2005a, p. 3). 
 
Of all of the processes that enabled solutions to be found to the problems that beset 
Apollo 13, simulations of the type described above were essential. They were designed to 
be authentic, just as were used to train pilots in flight simulators (Lee, 2017). All of the 
actors participated, including astronauts in authentic settings and intensive reviews were 
conducted after each iteration. The simulations had the vital function of facilitating 
collective learning (Lau, Lee and Chung, 2019). Also, importantly, simulations provided 
opportunities to identify precise targets for innovation when there was time to undertake 
innovation initiatives (NASA managers took the view that as little innovation as possible 
should be taken during an actual flight as the chances of error were too great). The case 
example described above shows that, in NASA, failures in simulations led to substantial 
resources being allocated to find solutions. This readiness to act on evidence from  
simulation failures proved to be critical to the ability of Mission Control to find effective, 
and often proven, answers to extremely complex problems in highly time constrained 
contingencies. 
 
The insight that extensive and forensic simulations of multiple contingencies 
increases the capacity to respond effectively to crises is transferable (Sterman, 2014). We 
suggest that four initiatives are relevant. First, identify and rank systemic risks in terms of 
likely consequences (Tavares, Da Silva and De Souza, 2019). Second, find pertinent 
existing simulations (if available) and test them as prototypes (Quillinan et al., 2009). 
Third, establish a simulation-orientated learning programme that, over time, addresses 
possible high-impact failures (Straus et al., 2019). Lastly, rigorously check that failures in 
simulations have led to remedial improvements (Antonacopoulou et al., 2019). 
 
 
Organisational Attribute Five: Clarity about Decision Ownership 
 
“The flight director probably has the simplest mission job description in all America, 
Kranz (Flight Director on the Apollo 13 Mission) told Spectrum. ‘It’s only one sentence 
long: ‘The flight director may take any action necessary for crew safety and mission 
success.’ The only way for NASA to overrule a flight director during a mission was to 
fire him on the spot. The rule vesting ultimate authority in the flight director during a 
mission was on the books thanks to Chris Kraft, who founded mission control as NASA’s 
first flight director and who was deputy director of the Manned Spacecraft Center during 
Apollo 13. He had written the rule following an incident during the Mercury program 
when Kraft, as flight director, had been second-guessed by management. This time, as the 
crisis unfolded, no one had any doubts as to who was in charge” (Cass, 2005a, p. 4). 
 
 A major concern in NASA was to achieve clarity about who owns which decisions, 
how decision-makers should interrelate with each other and how decision-making 
ownership should flex in the circumstances of the moment. The issue is complex, as has 
been shown by experiments using different decision-making models in military scenarios 
(Alberts, 2015) which have demonstrated that factors such as the nature of the task, the 
degree of requirement for intra-operability and the depth of trust between lead actors 
result in decision-making models needing to be contingent. In the Apollo 13 case 
NASA’s aim was to routinise decision-making by developing flight manuals that 
specified what and how needed to be done in pre-defined circumstances, using a model 
that Mintzberg (Mintzberg and Waters, 1983) described as a professional bureaucracy. 
After the explosion, so many contingencies developed that went outside the pre-prepared 
flight manuals that a different organisational modality was required. These were targeted 
adhocracies (Waterman Jr., 1992), that had short-cycle decision rights and were aligned 
by standardised investigation problem-solving processes and by accumulated practices, 
developed largely in simulations, that had become encapsulated through mutual 
adjustment and become a property of the collective mind.  
 
The insight that clarity about decision ownership is essential for an organisation to be 
able to respond effectively to crises is transferable, indeed it has been known for 
millennia (Tzu, 1981). Less well understood is how changes in the nature of challenges, 
and of technologies to manage information flows, affect decision-making stratagems. For 
these reasons we suggest that three initiatives are relevant. First, identify a significant 
incident in which the organisation failed to make prudent, timely and effective decisions 
to deal with an unexpected challenge or crisis and undertake an inquire to discover what 
could have been done what would have been more effective (Alberts et al., 2014). 
Second, arrange for senior managers to become aware of recent experiments and 
assessments or effective decision-making using modern technologies (Marchau et al., 
2019). Lastly, ask for input from across the organisation as to what could be done to 
improve decision-making (Church, 2017). 
 
Organisational Attribute Six: Aligned Granular Innovation Capability 
 
“The command module was built by North American and had a square (lithium-
hydroxide for removing CO2 from the atmosphere) canister. The LM was built by 
Grumman Aircraft and that had round canisters and so they wouldn’t fit (the LM’s air 
purification system).  (Fong) These are two state-of-the-art spacecraft worth billions of 
dollars but there is a tiny difference in the design of their life support systems. For Apollo 
13 this is what it comes down to. The shape of a hole. A feature so seemingly 
unimportant that even detail-obsessed NASA hadn’t thought through its implications: but 
now it threatens the astronauts’ lives. There were no plans for this eventuality. To rescue 
the mission NASA would have to indulge in a rare feat of pure improvisation. NASA had 
learned to be wary of creativity and inventiveness in the heat of the moment. Knowing 
that plans hatched in the midst of battle often harboured hidden flaws. But it had no 
choice. In mission control another team of engineers splits off to take on the problem. 
Astronaut Tony England is assigned to the group and recalls ‘They could only use what 
was in the LM to build an adapter) so that all this stuff on the table and they were taping 
it together to see whether it was going to work. It was a makeshift deal. We had 
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cardboard, duck tape and we actually had a sock that we stuffed in to fill up a hole… it 
had to be airtight and durable.…’ (Fong) Dozens of people were involved. Equipment is 
shuttled backwards and forwards across the country on specially chartered flights (Fong, 
2020a). 
 
This extract from a recent BBC podcast series, presented by Kevin Fong, provides 
important insights into how NASA managed innovation. Fong explained that the essence 
of NASA had been determined by the mission defined by President Kennedy and,  
importantly, it had been given the resources and political momentum to complete its 
mission. It is revealing to re-examine the original speech to understand better the nature 
of NASA’s mission. 
 
President Kennedy’ speech on September 12, 1962 included these words: “man, in his 
quest for knowledge and progress, is determined and cannot be deterred. The exploration 
of space will go ahead, whether we join in it or not, and it is one of the great adventures 
of all time, and no nation which expects to be the leader of other nations can expect to 
stay behind in the race for space… In short, our leadership in science and in industry, our 
hopes for peace and security, our obligations to ourselves as well as others, all require us 
to make this effort, to solve these mysteries, to solve them for the good of all men, and to 
become the world's leading space-faring nation… We choose to go to the moon. We 
choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are 
easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the 
best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, 
one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the others, too” 
(NASA, 2012). 
 
The chief goal, defined by Kennedy, was for the USA to acquire and sustain 
“leadership in science and in industry” by achieving the feat of putting Americans on the 
moon. It is not an exaggeration to state that this required entering a new technological 
paradigm (Harris, 1992). Innovation would be required in every dimension of endeavour, 
from space medicine to computer-controls. The focus of this vast, multidimensional 
innovation effort was to become able, reliably, to put men on the moon which was a 
flight, similar in some ways to that of an aircraft. Those involved in aircraft development, 
for example in Lockheed’s skunkworks (May, 2003), knew that novelty was both 
progressive and dangerous and so developed a managerial philosophy that adopted 
(probably unconsciously) the principle of ‘checks and balances’ (Hamilton and Madison, 
1788), meaning that critical evaluation was as significant as invention. 
 
The capability to be both bold and critical in engineering needs to be highly detailed. 
Examples of topics that need to be mastered include design of a switch that will operate 
reliably in a vacuum, a process for ensuring a correct flow of fuel during a burn or the 
design of computer memories that are capable of withstanding cosmic ray burst. World-
class expertise is needed and this requires specialist, or granular, innovation capability 
that is managed using checks and balances. However, granularity promotes organisational 
silos (Cilliers and Greyvenstein, 2012) that can be dysfunctional for systemic integration. 
Hence, alignment of innovation initiatives is essential. A careful and dynamic balance 
between integration and differentiation is a managerial imperative (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). 
  
The insight that aligned granular innovation capability is essential for an organisation 
to be able to respond effectively to crises is transferable. In crises there will be 
unpredicted events, such as the inability of the astronauts on Apollo 13 to use available 
lithium-hydroxide canisters in a different life-support system from their intended use. 
Such problems require dedicated granular teams with specialist expertise and resource 
availability. we suggest that two initiatives are relevant. First, to practice forming ad hoc 
granular teams to address simulated problems (Jacobsson and Hällgren, 2016) and 
second, to give those with system-wide responsibilities the opportunity to practice 
managing alignment and instilling appropriate checks and balances (Campbell, 
Whitehead and Finkelstein, 2009). 
 
Organisational Attribute Seven: Proof of the Capability of Individuals to be 
Efficient and Effective, Despite Adversity 
 
“Confidence was part of the bedrock upon which mission control was built. When 
prospective controllers joined NASA, often fresh out of college, they started out by being 
sent to contractors to collect blueprints and documents. They then digested those into 
information that mission controllers could use during a mission, such as the wiring 
diagrams that the lunar module controllers had used to figure out how to power up the 
Aquarius. After that, the proto-flight controllers started participating in simulations. The 
principal problem NASA had with these neophytes was “one of self-confidence,” 
explains Kranz. “We really worked to develop the confidence of the controllers so they 
could stand up and make these real-time decisions. Some people, no matter how hard we 
worked, never developed the confidence necessary for the job.” Those not suited for 
mission control were generally washed out within a year” (Cass, 2005b, p. 2). 
 
During NASA’s huge expansion of personnel in the early 1960s there was often a 
short selection process, with young people being hired from their CV alone and without 
an interview (Fong, 2020b). Most recruits were from the hard sciences, having studied 
subjects like mathematics, engineering, physics. All these skills were needed in a rapidly 
growing NASA but for those that would deal with possible problems or crises, such as 
mission controllers, the capacity to function in highly stressful situations was essential.  
This was tested in simulations and only those that thrived would be selected for these 
demanding roles. 
 
Those with mission-specific decision power, in particular the Flight Director, could 
be in a position that many would find totally overwhelming. Fong (2020a) reports that the 
lead Flight Director for the Apollo 13 mission was “Eugene Francis Kranz ('Gene', the  
Flight Director). He was an ex-marine. He was always a pumped up guy. He hardly ever 
sat down. He passed the floor. He was that intense. We playfully called him the Prussian 
General. Gene was a very serious hard-working disciplinarian. And he was good. Could 
be pretty tough. That was OK. We needed that sometimes. He is a one of a kind guy.” 
The fact that Kranz had been a military officer is significant as the armed forces are one 
of the few fields of employment that regard ‘grit’ or ‘hardiness’ as a core personality 
requirement (Von Culin, Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2014). 
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Francis (2020) writing about organisational agility, an essential component of 
effective crisis management, states that: “leadership in agile organisations requires a 
depth of character. This somewhat unfashionable insight is central to understanding the 
attributes of the elite leadership group that is ever-present in successful agile 
enterprises… Acquiring individuals with grit for key roles in an organisation is more than 
a task for specialists in human resource management, as it is a strategic act. It is 
remarkable just how far world-class agile enterprises will go to seek, find, motivate and 
honour individuals with the combination of advanced technical prowess and personal grit. 
Not everyone possesses an inner commitment to pursue aspirational goals with 
unstoppable zeal and diligence. Interestingly, people with grit do not necessarily 
demonstrate superior talent; rather superior diligence, confidence to be proactive and 
enough humility to be a team player”. 
 
The insight that the proven capability of individuals to be efficient and effective, 
despite aversity, is essential for an organisation to be able to respond effectively to crises 
is transferable. Put simply, in crises the required quality of leadership is greater. Hence, 
we suggest that three initiatives are relevant. First, those that will be leaders in crisis 
situations need specialised training to help them to gain the required mind-sets and skill-
sets (Von Culin, Tsukayama and Duckworth, 2014). Second, ways need to be found to 
test whether possible leaders have the personal resilience to cope constructively with 
highly stressful situations (Murray, Berkowitz and Lerner, 2019). Lastly, 360-degree 
feedback needs to be available to facilitate reflective learning (Schön, 1983). 
 
Organisational Attribute Eight: A Heedful Group-Mind 
 
“The first astronaut assigned to Grumman was Fred Haise, who would eventually use the 
knowledge gained by his deep involvement in the Lunar Module program to get his 
crippled spacecraft home when Apollo 13 used the module as a lifeboat. His intimate 
understanding of the LM and its inner workings went a long way toward saving his crew. 
When he first arrived at the Grumman plant, Haise was on a walk-through of the LM 
assembly area when he pulled one of the Grumman executives aside to make a request. 
The man looked surprised, saying something to the effect of, "Mr. Haise, hundreds of 
people are working on the LM!" Haise was undeterred ... and later that day, he placed 
himself at the head of a line that snaked through the plant and well outside the door and 
beyond. He wanted to shake the hand of every single person who was working on the 
Lunar Module, and he did. It was a brilliant way to get the builders of this complex, 
fragile machine onto his team. None of them ever forgot this simple gesture - they built a 
perfect flying machine for ‘Fred’ (Pyle, 2014, p. 96). 
 
The Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, later Grumman Aerospace Corporation, 
was a main contractor for NASA. They had won the contract to develop the Lunar 
Module (LM), which required multiple forms of radical innovation. NASA’s astronauts 
and mission controllers needed to understand how the LM functioned in great depth, so 
many NASA people, including Fred Haise, the intended lunar module pilot on Apollo 13 
mission, worked closely with Grumman. The incident described above, when Haise 
shook the hand of everyone working on the development of the LM, led to the Gramman 
 engineers considering their task as helping Haise to undertake his dangerous task with the 
best possible equipment. They had Haise in mind as they did their work. 
 
In the 1980s the US Office of Naval Research helped to fund a five-year study of air 
operations aboard Nimitz class carriers. These had been described as ‘a million accidents 
waiting to happen’ (Wilson, 1986, p. 21). Weick and Roberts (1993), reported on the  
Nimitz research and observed that “almost none of them do… The explanation we wish 
to explore is that organizations concerned with reliability enact aggregate mental 
processes that are more fully developed than those found in organizations concerned with 
efficiency” (p. 357). The researchers concluded that people working on aircraft carriers 
“act heedfully when they act more or less carefully, critically, consistently, purposefully, 
attentively, studiously, vigilantly, conscientiously, pertinaciously” (p. 361) and this 
orientation to collective sensemaking is key to understanding why complex hazards can 
be managed effectively. Weick and Roberts conclude that “a well-developed organization 
mind, capable of reliable performance is thoroughly social. It is built of ongoing 
interrelating and dense interrelations. Thus, interpersonal skills are not a luxury in high-
reliability systems. They are a necessity. These skills enable people to represent and 
subordinate themselves to communities of practice. As people move toward 
individualism and fewer interconnections, organization mind is simplified and soon 
becomes indistinguishable from individual mind. With this change comes heightened 
vulnerability to accidents… With more development of social skills goes more 
development of organization mind and heightened understanding of environments” (p. 
378). 
 
NASA had developed a similar heedful group mind and they had succeeded in extending 
this into the support ecosystem, incorporating contractors like Grumman. When disaster 
struck Apollo 13 people rushed to help. It has been estimated that several thousand 
individuals made a contribution, many who volunteered and proposed ways of helping. 
The many accounts of how crises were mitigated (Fong, 2020b) describe multiple acts of 
heedful endeavour. Other priorities were postponed. A phrase from the days of sailing 
ships in distress “all hands to the pumps” captures the commitment to undertake effective 
action. 
 
The insight that a heedful group mind helps to enable an organisation to respond 
effectively to crises is transferable. Unlike managerial initiatives that focus on processes 
and performance, this requires focusing on the emotional and social life of the 
organisation. We suggest that three initiatives are relevant. First, those in the upper 
echelon of an organisation study the role of heedful interaction as a modality of 
sensemaking and formulate leadership initiatives to encourage its development (Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). Second, those responsible for organisation development 
devise experiential activities that raise consciousness as to the importance of mutual 
heedful interaction (Solansky and Stringer, 2019). Lastly, recognition is given to 
incidents where people react heedfully, to promote this attribute as a honoured cultural 
meme (Drew and Wallis, 2014). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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The ways that NASA responded to the crises that occurred during the Apollo 13 
mission demonstrates the critical importance of building an organisation that is able and 
willing to act intelligently, decisively and quickly. The organisational attributes that 
enabled this to occur were not invented when the crisis struck. Rather, they had been 
developed over time enabling NASA to be agile in action, innovative in solution finding, 
cohesive in culture, motivating a talent-rich elite organisation, rigorous in practice and 
quintessentially human in respecting honourable endeavour. It will be important to 
undertake further research in this area, so as to deepen our knowledge of the leadership 
and managerial actions required to enable organisations to respond effectively to crises 
and test the eight organisational attributes model outlined in this paper. 
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